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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the advertising competition in the free-broadcast
TV industry within a two-sided market framework. A structural model of oligopoly
competition is fitted to a unique dataset on the French broadcast television market,
allowing us to exhibit the significance and the magnitude of the network externalities
between TV viewers and advertisers and to confirm the two-sidedness nature of this
industry. After having validated the conjecture that the competition in the TV adver-
tising market is of the Cournot type, we provide empirical evidence that the price-cost
margin, which does not account for the feedback loops between the two sides of a
market, is not a proper indicator of market power of firms operating in two-sided mar-
kets. Finally, we conduct counterfactual simulations of a merger in French TV market
approved by the competition authority under the behavioral remedy which consists in
maintaining independent the advertising sales house of the merged TV channels. We
show that the behavioral remedy was unnecessary, due to the two-sidedness nature of
the market.
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1 Introduction
Observing that the advertisers’ willingness to pay increases with the viewership, TV chan-
nels broadcast TV programs free-to-air to the viewers but charge heavily the advertisers.1
The price of watching TV being nil, the viewers apparently pay below the broadcasting
cost. Based on Rochet and Tirole (2008), the economic rationale of this framework, which
challenges the traditional view of competition law prohibiting the below cost selling, can be
attributed to the two-sidedness nature of TV channels behaving as platforms that enable
interactions between viewers and advertisers.
This paper aims to provide an empirical evaluation of the significance and the mag-
nitude of two-sided network externalities in broadcast TV industry. More specifically, we
identify the shape of the feedback loop between viewers and advertisers and clarify the
conduct of TV channels in the advertising market. Our final objective is to provide a cred-
ible evaluation of the traditional economic tools implemented by competition authorities
in this market.
Indeed, the study is motivated by a recent acquisition case in the French broadcast
TV industry. On 26 January 2010, the French competition authority (Autorité de la
concurrence, AdC) has authorized the acquisition of two free broadcast TV channels TMC
and NT1 by the media-holding company, TF1 Group, subject to various conditions. Before
the acquisition, the TF1 Group, as the most active media group in the French free broadcast
TV industry, already enjoyed a dominant position in the national TV advertising market
by holding approximately 40% − 50% of the market. The acquisition of two channels in
addition can even strengthen the Group’s market position. The AdC worries that, if all
the three channels (i.e., TF1, TMC and NT1) offer their advertising spaces through one
common advertising sales house, the operation would lessen the degree of competition in
the advertising market. For this reason, the AdC has approved the acquisition only under
behavioral remedies including the maintenance of separation in advertising offers of TF1
on the one hand, and TMC and NT1 on the other hand.2
Contrary to pay TV channels for which the subscription fees of TV viewers represent
a significant share of income, the TV channels broadcasting free-to-air draw their revenue
only from advertising. Their business model is distinctive in the sense that the demand
of TV viewers can affect their revenues only indirectly through its interaction with the
demand of advertisers. The larger the audience size of a TV channel, the higher the
advertiser willingness to pay for advertising spaces; however, the TV viewers may be ad-
averse, in which case, the larger the quantity of advertising, the higher the risk that the
audience size of the TV channel shrinks. In other words, the free TV channels experience a
feedback loop between viewers and advertisers. If these network externalities are identified
to be significant, one may conjecture that the feedback loop plays a role in the analysis of
competition outcomes.
This calls for considering the free TV channels as two-sided platforms selling two distinct
products: TV programs to viewers on the one side, and advertising spaces to advertisers
on the other side. A first econometric task here amounts to specifying a structural model
of oligopoly competition among free TV channels and identifying the two-sided nature of
1Note that this situation is similar to the case of internet. Indeed users search on the web free of
charges; however, when they click on specific hyperlinks, they also trigger ads which generate revenues for
the owner(s) of web browsers.
2See the AdC’s decision at
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/10DCC11decisionversionpublication.pdf.
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this industry.
Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006) provide a framework for analyzing
two-sided markets. Based on this approach, theoretical articles by Anderson and Coate
(2005), Cunningham and Alexander (2004), and Nilssen and Sørgard (2000), among others,
have addressed TV advertising competition by assuming that the ads are a nuisance to TV
viewers and the TV channels compete by setting advertising quantity. However, only a
few empirical analyses use this approach. Until now, the empirical studies have examined
the two-sided structure of the industries of newspapers (Chandra and Collard-Wexler,
2009; Argentesi and Ivaldi, 2007; Argentesi and Filistrucchi, 2007; Filistrucchi, Klein, and
Michielsen, 2012; Fan, 2013), magazines (Kaiser and Wright, 2006), yellow pages (Rysman,
2004), and radios (Jeziorski, 2014; Berry, Eizenberg and Waldfogel, 2016). Wilbur (2008)
used the two-sided concept to analyze the importance of TV viewers’ and advertisers’
preferences in driving TV channels’ programming choices and the impact of ad-avoidance
technology on TV channels’ advertising revenues with data of six US TV channels. Previous
empirical findings suggest that the attitudes of the audience (readers/viewers/listeners)
toward advertising vary by industry: The audience tends to appreciate advertising in
magazines, yellow pages, and certain types of newspapers, but it dislikes advertising in
broadcasting industry (radio and TV).3 Hence, it is an empirical issue to identify the sign
of the network effects between the two sides of the market, and this is crucial because
depending on this sign, one can expect from the theory that it impacts the pricing of the
distinct product on each side of the market.
Free-broadcast TV channels constitute the most important medium for advertising.
However, only a few papers have empirically analyzed the advertising competition in this
industry. Some, such as Masih (1999), Ekelund et al. (2000) and Crawford et al. (2017),
have estimated the price-elasticity of advertising demand in model frameworks that ignore
the feedback loop between TV viewers and advertisers. Our paper contributes to this
literature by investigating the advertising competition in the French free TV industry in
a two-sided market framework using a unique monthly dataset on 21 French national free
TV channels from March 2008 to December 2013. Our estimation results suggest that the
TV viewers dislike advertising on TV and that the network effects between TV viewers
and advertisers are significant.
To perform the competitive analysis raised by the merger between the channels TF1,
TMC, and NT1 in this setup, it is necessary to well identify the conduct of TV channels. In
quantitative analysis for competition policy, it is common to assume Bertrand competition;
however, in the context of broadcasting markets, Cournot competition is often considered.
Since broadcast TV stations have limited capacities (24 hours of broadcasting time per
day), there is a strong presumption that the Cournot assumption is appropriate. To confirm
this conjecture, we implement a simple procedure to test for the market conduct of French
free broadcast TV channels by comparing the estimated marginal costs under the two
alternative conduct assumptions.
Once identified the exact conduct of TV channels in the advertising market, we are in
the position to perform competitive analysis of the market that we investigate. We first
provide empirical evidence that the price-cost margin is not a good indicator of market
power of firms operating in two-sided markets. We show empirically how the share of adver-
tising prices that is committed to compensating viewers for the adverse effect of advertising
3Ivaldi and Muller (2018) estimate the different effects of advertising on readership of newspapers and
entertainment magazines with French market data. They find that readers appreciate advertising on
entertainment magazines but dislike advertising on newspapers.
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is important, more precisely between 5% and 16% for the public TV stations and between
21% and 52% for the private TV stations, while this share determines the departure of the
price-cost margin from the Lerner Index which measures the market power of TV channels
in the advertising market. In fact, following Rochet and Tirole (2006), the Lerner Index
of a two-sided market platform should take into account the network externalities between
the two sides of a market and therefore can not be simply the price-cost margin of one
side of the market.4 This result is suggestive to the competition law and policy. Secondly,
we measure by counterfactual simulation the effect of merger of advertising sales houses
of three channels belonging to a big TV group. Our counterfactual experiment avoids
the conventional criticism against merger simulation which ignores the efficiency gains of
merger and acquisition, because we observe a specific period (01/2010-12/2013) during
which the acquisition has occurred but the advertising sales houses of the three channels
were maintained independent. As we simulate the merger of advertising sales houses in
this background, we systematically take into account the efficiency gains of the acquisition.
Our results suggest that, everything else being equal, there is no significant difference in
terms of advertising quantities between the observed situation under which the remedies
imposed by the competition authority applies and the counterfactual scenario where the
remedies have not been implemented. This means that, with or without remedies, the mar-
ket outcomes are equivalent. In fact, the channels’ potential benefit from a cooperation
among advertising sales houses is defeated by the viewers’ adverse taste for advertising,
i.e., by the effect of the feedback loop between viewers and advertisers. This result invites
us to conclude that the behavioral remedy imposed by the French competition authority
when approving the operation of acquisition under investigation were not necessary.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the market
characteristics and data sources. In Section 3, we propose a structural model for the free-
broadcast TV industry. Section 4 is devoted to the econometric specification. Section
5 presents the estimation method and results. In section 6, we do empirical analysis to
determine, in particular, the conduct of TV channels in the advertising market. In Section
7, we conduct competitive analysis to assess the importance of the two-sided network
externalities in market competition, and to discuss the counterfactual experiment which
aims at evaluating the impact of a merger of advertising sales houses in the French TV
market. We then conclude in Section 8.
2 Market and data analysis
2.1 Market characteristics
Digital terrestrial television (DTTV) was formally introduced in France in the beginning
of 2005 and has gradually replaced the aged analogue broadcasting mode of the free TV.5
This new technology offers more broadcasting capacity, and its implementation stimulated
the arrivals of several new TV channels. Before the commercial launch of DTTV, there
were only five national TV channels broadcasted free-to-air in France. After the CSA
officially allowed and promoted the adoption of DTTV, 11 new free-broadcast TV channels
were launched at once. Later, in December 2012, six additional channels were initiated.
4We provide the expression of Lerner Index of a broadcast TV station in section 7.1.
5With DTTV, households can receive many more channels than with a traditional TV aerial, all in
digital quality. To switch to DTTV, households need an adapter (a set top box) for their television and to
adapt their aerials.
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Currently, French households have access to a total of 22 free broadcast TV channels.6
The newly launched DTTV channels, as entrants in the national TV market, do not
enjoy the same market position as the five incumbent channels. In Table 1, we provide
comparative statistics of audience shares and advertising revenue shares of the incumbent
channels versus the new arrivals. The market shares of new entrants are remarkably lower
than the incumbents on both sides.
Table 1: Audience shares and advertising revenues of incumbent versus new channels
Year Channel seniority Audience shares Advert revenue shares
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
2008 Incumbent 13.2% 0.074 17.0% 0.189
New 1.0% 0.006 1.5% 0.006
2009 Incumbent 12.7% 0.071 15.7% 0.188
New 1.3% 0.006 2.2% 0.010
2010 Incumbent 12.1% 0.067 14.8% 0.174
New 1.7% 0.008 2.6% 0.013
2011 Incumbent 11.6% 0.063 13.7% 0.160
New 1.9% 0.008 3.2% 0.015
2012 Incumbent 11.5% 0.060 13.2% 0.158
New 2.0% 0.008 3.4% 0.016
2013 Incumbent 11.2% 0.060 12.8% 0.152
New 1.4% 0.010 2.4% 0.018
Among these 22 free TV channels, 17 channels are private and 5 are publicly owned.
Fourteen of them are general, offering a wide range of program genres and targeting a
large audience. Aside from these, two channels are specialized in news broadcasting, one
in music, one in children’s programs, one in documentaries, one in films and another in
sports. Many of these channels belong to the same TV group. In Table 5 in Appendix 1,
we provide a list of TV channels in our dataset with their type (generalist, news, music,
movie, sport, child, or documentary), ownership nature (public or private), and TV group
membership.
Broadcast TV stations are two-sided platforms connecting TV viewers to advertisers.
TV viewers value the media content and are willing to pay for it. As they watch TV,
they generate audiences that are, in turn, valuable for advertisers. Contrary to pay TV
channels which charge subscription fees to viewers, the broadcast TV stations only require
the viewers to bear the advertising.
On the advertising market, advertisers look for audiences, and TV channels supply
them. Advertisers value audience for the ability to inform and/or persuade viewers on
the merits of products or services they have to commercialize. The TV channels sell their
advertising spaces through advertising sales houses (ASHs). In general, each TV group
that holds several TV channels owns or cooperates with one ASH. In practice, each TV
6Notice that our analysis only focuses on the free-broadcast TV market. Pay TV channels are included
in the outside goods of our econometric model below. During the period of observation (2008–2013),
while there are between 184 and 207 pay TV channels available in France, their cumulated audience share
amounts to not more than 10% in total, and their cumulated advertising revenue share is approximately
16% to 18%. The individual market share of any of these pay TV is then negligible, and statistics on the
market share of each pay channel are not available.
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group determines the capacity of advertising spaces for all of its channels based on their
program schedules and communicates the various advertising spots to its ASH. Advertisers
search for ad-spots that match their expected audience (in terms of number of viewers
and their demographics) from different ASHs. The ASHs charge the advertisers a cost
per thousand (CPT), which corresponds to the value of reaching 1000 viewers, for each
ad-slot. A channel’s revenue from an advertising spot is equal to the spot’s CPT times
the number of viewers of the spot. On this basis, we derive the average price per minute
of an advertising spot by dividing the observed revenue by the corresponding number of
advertising minutes.
In France, TV programs are published one month prior to the broadcasting time; last
minute adjustment rarely occurs. In contrast, the contents of advertising campaigns are
adjusted in real time to reach the desired effects.
We notice from our data that the number of advertising spots does not vary much from
one channel to another, while there is a large difference in the prices of the advertising spots
of incumbent channels and new entrants. (See Table 6 in Appendix 1 for details on the
standard errors of advertising prices and quantities.) The prices considered in this study
are average prices of an advertisement but are not on a per-viewer basis. Differences in the
prices of advertising spots between two categories of TV channels reflect the differences in
their viewership.
In France, the number of advertising minutes on TV is regulated. The CSA imposes
double caps on different TV channels on the basis of clock hours and daily average levels.7
As we use monthly average level of advertising herein, what matters is whether the regula-
tion caps on maximum minutes of advertising per day is binding. In Table 7 in Appendix
1, we compare the observed advertising minutes to the maximum minutes authorized by
the CSA. Note that the regulation constraints (at monthly average level) are never binding
over the entire period of observation.8
2.2 Data
The CSA has given us access to a first dataset consisting of information on audience,
gross advertising revenues and advertising quantities. This dataset covers detailed monthly
information on 21 free TV channels in France from March 2008 to December 2013.9 The
broadcasting data come originally from Médiamétrie, which provides a measurement on the
television audience, based on a panel of households equipped with one or more TV sets in
their main residence. This panel has been built to account for both the socio-demographic
characteristics of households in metropolitan France and the structure of the television
supply. It is made up of nearly 4,300 households, which corresponds to approximately
10,500 individuals aged 4 and over.
In each home, Médiamétrie installs one or more audimeters (depending on how many
pieces of equipment they have) fitted with a remote control with individual keys, which
7The average time per hour per day devoted to advertising must not exceed 6 minutes for public
TV channels, 9 minutes for the incumbent private channels, and 12 minutes during the first 7 years of
broadcasting for the new channels launched in 2005 and 2012. Moreover, the advertising time cannot
exceed 12 minutes within any given clock hour for the private TV broadcasters and 8 minutes for the
public TV broadcasters.
8The restrictions on advertising minutes is an important issue, though our data do not allow for exploring
its effect. This topic is studied in Zhang (2016) and Crawford et al. (2017).
9Our sample excludes Arte, the Franco-German public channel, because we have no information on
its advertising revenues. Nevertheless, this should not affect the significance of our results because the
audience share of this channel is very small, less than 2%.
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constantly record all uses of the television set(s) in the household and all the viewing habits
of each member of the household and their guests.10 This survey gathers information of
the audience shares, the total population having access to TV services (all reception modes
together) in metropolitan France, and the average watching time per day per individual.
The average watching time per day per individual is an aggregate variable as we do not
have detailed per channel data.
The advertising data are measured by Kantar Media. We have access to the number of
advertising minutes and the gross advertising revenues per month of different TV channels.
From these data, we construct the number of advertising spots and their corresponding
prices. We compute the number of advertising spots by dividing the number of advertising
minutes by the standard length of an advertising spot, which is 30 seconds. The price
of an advertising spot is calculated by dividing the gross advertising revenues by their
corresponding numbers of advertising spots. The prices calculated in such a way correspond
to the market prices established on the basis of the channels’ audience performance and
quantities of advertising supply.
In addition to the dataset provided by CSA, we collected complementary information
from published reports of the Centre national du cinéma et de l’image animée (CNC),
Kantar Media and different TV channels. The list of variables include the total amount of
advertising expenditures in the cinema market, the total quantity of advertising on radio,
the total number of hours of French audiovisual programs broadcast during the year, the
number of movies broadcast during the prime time (20:30 - 22:20), the amount of subsidies
allocated to the public broadcasters, the financial participation of each channel in the
production of movies and French audiovisual programs, and the total number of employees
of each TV group.11 These data either serve as instrumental variables or as components of
cost equations at the estimation stage. Their units, periodicities, and means are provided
in Table 8 in Appendix 1.
3 Structural model
We specify a structural model of oligopoly competition for the French broadcast TV in-
dustry. There are J channels belonging to K owners that each broadcast 24 hours per
day free-to-air. The TV operators face two interacting groups of consumers: TV viewers
and advertisers. The TV viewers watch the programs for free, so there is no direct profit
generated from the broadcasting market. However, the audience of free channels affects
the demand of advertisers. By allowing the channels to compete on the advertising mar-
ket through audience, our model specification explicitly captures the interactions between
viewers and advertisers. This model setting comprises three parts: the demand of TV
viewers which is specified by a nested-logit model; the demand of advertisers which is an
adaptation of the model of Rysman (2004) to broadcast TV market and is consistent with
the other studies in broadcasting market such as Wilbur (2008) and Eizenberg and Wald-
fogel (2016); the advertising supply of TV channels is under oligopoly competition, we test
the channels’ conduct under Cournot assumption versus Bertrand assumption.
10Source Médiamétrie: http://www.mediametrie.fr .
11Many channels in our sample share a common ownership, i.e., belong to the same media group. It is
impossible to distinguish the number of employees of different channels in the same media group.
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3.1 Demand of TV viewers
We here adopt a nested logit model to specify the demand of TV viewers in the aim of
controlling for the change in notoriety of different TV stations. As already mentioned in
Section 2.1, French households certainly differentiate between watching an incumbent and
a newly launched channel. The implementation of DTTV service has been achieved region
by region, and the newly launched DTTV channels were made accessible to the French
households progressively during the entire period of our observation.12 Those who get
used to watching the incumbent channels do not switch to the new channels immediately,
as the latter lack notoriety.
Let I be the potential market size corresponding to the total French population having
access to a TV service.13 At each point in time, an individual i = {1, ..., I} chooses to
watch one and only one of the broadcasting channels j = {1, ...J}, or to exercise an outside
option (like watching a pay channel, reading a magazine, going to a cinema, or another
substitutable activity). To account for the difference in notoriety between the incumbent
and entrant channels, denoted by m and n respectively, we classify them into two separate
nests. In what follows, we assume that a TV viewer first chooses among three categories
g = {m,n, 0}, where 0 stands for the outside option that corresponds to all the activities
other than watching the free TV; second, (s)he decides to watch a channel j ∈ Cg, where
Cg refers to the set of channels belonging to the category g.14 Finally, to account for
a change in notoriety over time, we introduce time specific effects at the empirical stage
below.
At each given period t, the indirect utility of consumer i from watching channel j,
belonging to the category g, is given by
U ijgt = δjt + ζ
i
jgt, (1)
with
δjt = V¯j + αAjt + ξt + ξjt, (2)
and
ζijgt = ε
i
gt + (1− σ)εijt, (3)
where δjt represents the mean utility level of TV viewers from watching channel j at time
t and ζijgt captures the departure of consumer i’s preference from the common utility level.
The component V¯j is a deterministic part that depends on the idiosyncratic characteristics
of channel j, Ajt represents the quantity of advertising at channel j and time t, ξjt is a
time specific component, ξjt is a random term reflecting the effect of unobserved factors
of channel j at time t on the mean utility of TV viewers. The parameter of interest to be
estimated, i.e., α, measures the audience’s attitude towards advertising. The error term
ζijgt is specified as a weighted sum of two unobserved variables: ε
i
gt, which affects the
individual i’s preferences common to all channels belonging to category g, and (1− σ)εijt,
which impacts the individual i’s preferences specific to product j. The error terms εigt and
12At the moment where the DTTV was formally adopted in 2005, only 35% of the French population
was covered by its service. This coverage rate has been gradually raised to 85% in 2007 and to 97% by the
end of 2011.
13We will perform robustness check later on by using different values of the market size for the estimation.
14We tested more complex specifications by adding nests according to the channels’ type, nature, and
group membership. None of them allow us to obtain economically meaningful models and/or to identify
the corresponding parameters of the additional nests.
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εijt are distributed in such a way that the individual preferences have an extreme value
distribution and are allowed to be correlated across channels j. (See MacFadden et al.,
1978 and Williams, 1977.) The parameter of interest to be estimated, σ ∈ [0, 1), measures
the degree of substitutability of TV channels belonging to the same category from the
TV viewers’ point of view. As σ approaches one, the TV viewers substitute significantly
between channels within the same category g, while as σ decreases, the correlation of
preferences for channels within a same category decreases. Typically, σ = 0 signifies that
the TV viewers are equally likely to switch between channels in different categories as
between channels in the same category.
Notice that there is no price in this model because watching broadcast TV channel
is free of charge. In fact, the quantity of advertising plays the role of price in the usual
differentiated-products oligopoly model. However, the parameter α can be either positive
or negative according to the attitude of viewers towards advertising: If α is positive, viewers
value ads positively; if it is negative, they dislike advertising.
Following Berry (1994), the mean utility level for the outside good is normalized to 0,
i.e., δ0 = 0, and the demand of viewers is specified as
ln(sjt) = V¯j + αAjt + σln(s¯jt/g) + ln(s0t) + ξt + ξjt, (4)
where sjt (s0t, respectively) is the probability that an individual chooses to watch channel j
(to take the outside option) at time t. The probability sjt is decomposed as the product of
two probabilities: the probability s¯jt/g of watching channel j given that channel j belongs
to category g and the probability s¯gt that an individual chooses to watch channels of
category g. This decomposition matters because of the different accessibility of incumbent
and new DTTV channels.
Given that we assume a representative consumer, the choice probabilities sjt, s¯jt/g, s0t
coincide at the aggregate level with the market share of channel j, the market share of
channel j within its category and the market shares of the outside goods, respectively. If,
at time t, Yt is the market size (that we precisely define later) and if yjt is the number of
TV viewers watching TV j, the market share of channel j and its market share within its
category are measured as sjt = yjt/Yt and s¯jt|g = sjt
/∑
j∈Cg sjt, respectively, while the
market share of the outside good is obtained as s0t = 1−
∑
j sjt.
From Equation (4), we define the number of viewers as yjt = sjtYt ≡ yjt (A), where
A = {A1, . . . , Aj , . . . , AJ} is the vector of advertising quantities of all channels.
3.2 Demand of advertisers
In the spirit of the model in Rysman (2004), we consider a representative advertiser
whose expected revenue per viewer from an advertising spot on channel j, denoted by
rj , is such that rj = λj (CPTj/1000), where CPTj measures how much the advertiser j
pays for reaching an audience of 1000 individuals. The scale factor λj is at least larger
than one because advertisers buy an advertising space only when their expected bene-
fit exceeds the cost. In what follows, for simplicity of notation, we consider the vector
C = (C1, C2, . . . , Cj , . . . , CJ), where Cj = CPTj/1000. Let p = (p1, p2, . . . , pj , . . . , pJ) and
a = (a1, a2, . . . , aj , . . . , aJ) be, respectively, the vectors of per minute price of advertising
and the average duration of an individual advertising spot of different TV channels. We
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specify the representative advertiser’s profit function as:15
ΠA =
J∑
j=1
(rj − pjaj) =
J∑
j=1
(λjCj − pjaj). (5)
In practice, CPTj (or Cj) is determined on the basis of four variables: 1) the average
duration of an advertising message, aj ; 2) the total capacity of channel j, Aj ; 3) the
viewership of channel j, yj , and 4) the decomposition of audience, Dj , in terms of socio-
demographic characteristics. We thus specify the market-determined Cj using a Cobb-
Douglas form, namely,
Cj = D
v1
j a
v2
j A
v3
j y
v4
j , (6)
where v2, v3 and v4 measure, respectively, the return of large advertisement, the “business
stealing effect” and the sensitivity of advertisers to the viewership of TV channels. We
expect the value of v2 to be between 0 and 1, the value of v3 to be negative, and the value
of v4 to be positive.16,17
Replacing the expression (6) into Equation(5) and maximizing ΠA over aj , we obtain
the inverse demand of advertising as:
pj = v2λjD
v1
j a
(v2−1)
j A
v3
j y
v4
j . (7)
As we consider an average advertiser who chooses its optimal amount of advertising to
broadcast on each channel j, we have Ajt = m¯ajt, where m¯ is the market size of advertis-
ing.18 Thus,
pj = v2τjD
v1
j m¯
(1−v2)A(v2+v3−1)j y
v4
j , (8)
which yields, with time index and in logarithmic form:
log pjt = log[v2λjtD
v1
jt m¯
(1−v2)] + (v2 + v3 − 1) logAjt + v4 log yjt. (9)
The final empirical specification of this inverse demand function is discussed below.
3.3 Supply of TV channels
The J free-broadcast TV channels belong to K different media groups on the French
market. Each media group owns or cooperates with a private advertising sales house
through which they sell advertising spaces to the advertisers. Channels within the same
media group maximize jointly their profits taking account the strategic reactions of other
groups.
The profit function of a media group Gk, k = {1, ...,K} from selling advertising spaces
is given by
ΠGk =
∑
j∈Gk
Πj =
∑
j∈Gk
[(pj − cj)Aj − Fj ] , (10)
15We drop the time index t in what follows, as it does not generate misunderstanding.
16The “business stealing effect” refers to the fact that an advertisement is ignored in a broadcast network
with a massive amount of advertisements.
17The return of large advertisement is expected to be decreasing because a long advertising message
has more chance to be remembered by the TV viewers, but the viewers may get tired of the same ad in
time. Therefore, the advertiser’s willingness to pay takes parabola form with respect to the length of the
advertising message.
18Consider a continuum of advertisers indexed by l ∈ [0, m¯] distributed as f(l). Denote the advertising
choice of advertiser l on the channel j as ajl, then Aj(P1, ..., PJ) =
∫ m¯
0
ajl(P1, ..., PJ)f(l)dl.
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where cj and Fj are, respectively, the marginal and fixed costs of channel j. TV stations
broadcast their programs free-to-air but essentially cover their programming costs from
advertising revenues. The fixed cost Fj measures the sunk investment of channel j on the
acquisition of the broadcasting right of its programs. The marginal costs of advertising
include mainly the management of advertising spaces but also the discounts proposed
by the TV channels to the advertisers. In practice, at the beginning of every year, the
TV stations propose a discount to each of their potential advertisers for the advertisers’
advertising messages during the year. Such a practice consists in a marketing strategy of
TV stations to capture future clients. We do not have any additional information on the
value of discounts except that there are specified between each TV channel and advertiser.
In other words, the value of the discounts indeed varies with time and channels.
The conduct of TV channels affects the way the feedback loop works between TV
viewers and advertisers. Under Cournot competition, a TV channel losses ad-adverse
viewers yj when its advertising quantity Aj increases; by consequence, the price of each
advertising minute pj diminishes. In the case of competition à la Bertrand in the advertising
market, advertisers’ demand Aj decreases with the per minute price of advertising pj , which
may attract additional ad-adverse TV viewers yj to the channel. However, an increase
in viewership yj would rise up the channel’s advertising prices pj , which encourages the
channel to advertise more. This will in turn affect viewership and subsequently advertising,
and so on.
Formally, under Cournot competition, each group Gk determines the optimal advertis-
ing quantities of channels within the group (Ajk, j ∈ Gk), taking the advertising quantities
of other groups as given, namely,
max
Ajk;j∈Gk
{ΠGk |A−j} = max
Ajk;j∈Gk
∑
j∈Gk
{[pj [Aj , yj(A)]− cj ]Aj |A−j} , (11)
where pj [Aj , yj(A)] is the inverse-demand curve of advertisers and A−j is the set of strategic
advertising decisions of all channels other than j. The associated first-order condition is
obtained as
(pj − cj) +Aj ∂pj
∂Aj
+Aj
∂pj
∂yj
∂yj
∂Aj
+
∑
i 6=j,j∈Gk
Ai
∂pi
∂yi
∂yi
∂Aj
= 0,∀j ∈ Gk. (12)
The advertising quantity affects the market clearing price through two ways: Directly, by
the standard price response to the advertising quantity supplied, which is given by the
second term on the left-hand side of Equation (12), and indirectly, by the network effect
between viewers and advertisers, represented by the third and fourth terms.
Under Bertrand competition, each group Gk determines the optimal spot price of ad-
vertising of channels within the group (Ajk, j ∈ Gk), taking the pricing of the other groups
as given, namely,
max
pjk;j∈Gk
{ΠGk |p−j} = max
pjk;j∈Gk
∑
j∈Gk
{(pj − cj)Aj [pj , yj(A)] |p−j} , (13)
where Aj [pj , yj(A)] is the direct demand curve of advertisers, and p−j is the set of adver-
tising prices of all channels other than j. The associated first-order condition is
Aj+(pj−cj)∂Aj
∂pj
+(pj−cj)∂Aj
∂yj
∂yj
∂Aj
∂Aj
∂pj
+
∑
i 6=j,i∈Gk
(pi−ci)∂Ai
∂yi
∂yi
∂Aj
∂Aj
∂pj
= 0,∀j ∈ Gk. (14)
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The explanation of the different terms of Equation (12) applies similarly to Equation (14).
We will test which assumptions (Cournot versus Bertrand) fit better with the data in
Section 6.2, in order to conclude on the nature of competition in the French broadcast TV
industry.
4 Econometric specification
We specify here the key variables of the theoretical model presented above to derive the
econometric model for estimation.
4.1 Demand of TV viewers
The deterministic part V¯j of the indirect utility of consumers, defined in Equation (2) and
appears in the equation of demand of TV viewers (4), is specified as a linear combination
of channel-fixed effects, i.e., dummies for all channels. In addition, two types of tempo-
ral effects are considered through the term ξt of the demand of viewers: Yearly dummies
capture the potential changes in policy, fluctuations of the economic climate and the gen-
eralization of the digital TV technology, while monthly dummies capture the seasonality
of TV viewing.
Our definition on the market share of TV channel j sjt, differs from the so-called
audience share qjt, used in the jargon of media marketing. The audience share, which is
directly available from the media marketing companies such as Mediametrie, is measured
in terms of the total population who watch TV over a market. Here, we allow for consumers
to select an activity other than watching free TV, which includes the possibility to watch
a pay TV channel or to enjoy other entertainments, such as going to a movie theater or
reading a newspaper. To do so, we consider the total population having access to a TV
serviceMt, and we derive the augmented audience yjt, i.e., the total number of TV viewers
watching channel j as yjt = qjtMt. Then, if Yt denotes the size of the French population
at period t, we estimate the market share of channel j as sjt = (yjt/Yt).19
Finally, from Equation (4), the TV viewers’ demand function to be estimated is given
by
ln(sjt)− ln(s0t) = αAjt + σln(s¯jt/g) +Xjtβ + ξjt, (15)
where Xjt includes all the dummy variables mentioned above.
4.2 Demand of advertisers
From Equation (9), we specify the inverse demand of advertisers to be estimated as
ln(pjt) = θln(Ajt) + ν4ln(yjt) +X
A
jtβ
A + ξAjt, (16)
where
θ ≡ ν2 + ν3 − 1. (17)
The term log[v2λjtDv1jt m¯
(1−v2)] in Equation (9) includes information on the demographics
of TV viewers and on the size of advertising market, which are channel specific and are time
19As using the size of the population having access to a TV service to measure the total population
watching TV is an approximation, we implement a robustness check by estimating the model for different
values of Mt. The details are presented in the next section.
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specific. We approximate it by XAjtβ
A + ξAjt, where X
A
jt and ξ
A
jt represent, respectively, the
observable and unobservable characteristics of channel j at time t that impact the demand
of advertisers. We specify XAjt as a linear combination of dummies for channel, monthly,
and annual fixed effects. Note that θ = ν2 + ν3 − 1 captures the joint effect of business
stealing and decreasing return to scale of advertising, and v4 measures the sensitivity of
advertisers to the viewership of TV channels as discussed in the model above. We expect
the estimated value of θ to be negative and the estimated value of v4 to be positive.
5 Estimation
The demand of TV viewers (Equation 15) and the demand of advertisers (Equation 16)
are separately estimated using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. Because both
equations encounter problems of endogeneity, an IV method is required. We explain now
our choice of instrumental variables for each equation.
5.1 Identification
Equation (15) entails two identification problems. The first one concerns the parameter
σ. Conceptually, observing the viewers’ switch between channels within the same category
(i.e., incumbent, entrant, or outside channels) over time should allow for identification of
σ, as it involves changes in the conditional probabilities of choosing the same category.
These variations can be either the result of changes in channels’ characteristics or the
result of changes in the number of channels operating on the market. However, there is
a potential endogeneity problem if viewers switch a channel because of some unobserved
changes in the characteristics of the TV channel. Indeed, in Equation (15), when ξjt is
high, the market share sjt is high, but the conditional market share, s¯jt/g, is also high, not
only because of the viewers’ switch from channels of its own category but also because of
some viewers that have switched from channels of other categories. For instance, when an
incumbent TV channel j increases the quality of its broadcasting content during period
t, it attracts additional viewers both from other incumbent channels and from the new
channels. We do not observe this change in the quality of channel j, which is captured
by ξjt; however, we observe an increase in its market share sjt and its conditional market
share s¯jt/g. As a consequence, the estimate of σ could be biased upwards unless s¯jt/g is
properly instrumented for.
The second issue of identification comes from the fact that the market shares of TV
channels sjt and the advertising quantities Ajt are determined simultaneously. The ran-
dom term ξjt includes characteristics of channel j during period t that are unobserved by
econometricians but are likely to be observed by the TV stations. The equilibrium level of
advertising Ajt should be high (or low) if the TV operator anticipates that its viewership
(its market share sjt) will be high (or low). Hence, without controlling for this fact, the
estimate of α would be biased upward (or downward, respectively).
Data on advertising in markets other than the free TV market can be used to instru-
ment the advertising quantity of TV channels, Ajt. Variables such as the total amount of
advertising expenditure in the cinema market and the total quantity of advertising in the
radio market are available on a monthly basis and constitute the best candidates to instru-
ment Ajt. Indeed, they are correlated with the advertising quantities because the demand
for advertising has seasonality. Broadly speaking, we notice picks in advertising quantities
during October - December, but drops in advertising quantities during July - August. The
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unit of advertising quantity in cinema market is very different to the unit of advertising
quantity in broadcasting market. We therefore choose to use the total advertising expen-
diture per month in the cinema market. The seasonality of advertising demand as well as
the correlation between TV advertising quantities, radio advertising quantities and total
advertising expenditure in the cinema market are displayed in Figure 1- 3 in Appendix 3.
We are confident to believe that the total amount of advertising expenditure in the cinema
market and the total quantity of advertising in the radio market are exogenous in Equation
(15), because it is unlikely that consumers switch from TV to Radio or Cinema due to the
quantity of advertising.
To instrument the channel’s audience share within its own category, i.e., s¯jt/g, we
need variables reflecting the status of TV channels in their own categories. In France,
the broadcasting contents of TV channels are partially regulated. French law stipulates
that TV channels must broadcast more than 40% of French audiovisual programs within
some particular hours of the day; the incumbent channels must accomplish this obligation
within the 5 hours in the evening, from 18:00 to 23:00, while the new digital TV channels are
allowed to satisfy the same obligation within a day, from 01:00 to 23:59. As a consequence,
we expect the incumbent channels to broadcast more French audiovisual programs. In
addition, as a policy intended to protect the French cinema sector, the capacity of TV
channels to broadcast movies is restricted, especially during the prime time (i.e., between
20:30 and 22:30). However, this constraint is somehow less stringent for the new digital
channels. Hence, we use the total number of hours of French audiovisual programs and
the number of films broadcast during the prime time 20:30 – 22:30 to instrument s¯jt/g.
We expect that their variations identify the demand for channels between the nests of our
model (i.e., between the incumbent and new channels). As we control for channel-, month-
and year- fixed effects in our estimation, the error term ξjt consists of unobserved specific
shocks on the quality of channel j within month-year t.
We are confident that the two instrumental variables (the total number of hours of
French audiovisual programs and the number of films broadcast during the the prime-time
20:30 – 22:30 ) are not correlated with ξjt for three reasons: First, the variables are observed
annually while our model is defined on a monthly basis; second, their value are stable
over the years as it can be observed from Table 2); third, these two variables do not vary
significantly in channel within the same nest (i.e. neither within the incumbents nor within
the new channels). In Table 2, we report the means and standard deviations of these two
variables within each nest year by year. Note that the values of the standard deviations
are much smaller than the values of their respective means. Moreover, we observe that the
incumbent channels broadcast on average more French audiovisual programs each year,
while the new channels broadcast more movies during the prime time. In other words,
these two instrumental variables are indeed correlated with s¯jt/g.20
In the equation of demand of advertisers (Equation 16), the variations in the adver-
tising prices ln(pit) of TV channels over time corresponding to variations in the channels’
viewership ln(yit) identify the value of v4, while the variations in advertising prices ln(pit)
of TV channels over time corresponding to variations in the channels’ advertising quantities
during the same period ln(Ajt) identify the value of θ. However, the variables ln(Ajt) and
ln(yjt) may be endogenous in Equation (16).
Advertisers request audiences to TV channels but generally do not choose the programs
20One may think about using the “characteristics (type of programs) of other channels within the same
group” as an alternative instrument. However, it is practically impossible to collect such information for
the period under investigation.
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Table 2: Variability of French audiovisual programs and films during prime time
Year Channel seniority French audiovisual programs Films during prime time
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
2008 Incumbent 57.64 6.46 46.40 21.08
New 40.61 21.42 86.90 57.02
2009 Incumbent 58.76 6.72 45.40 22.45
New 41.66 22.18 91.00 55.14
2010 Incumbent 59.14 8.81 42.60 22.46
New 42.97 22.92 95.60 56.57
2011 Incumbent 60.72 10.65 40.80 20.01
New 44.26 23.87 100.10 53.19
on which those adverts are shown as scheduling the broadcasting of adverts are indeed the
task of TV channels. The latter have inside informations on their quality of programs
and take them into account both when determining their advertising quantities and when
scheduling the different adverts. As we do not observe these informations as econometri-
cians, one must recognize that Equation (16) entails endogeneity problems. Likewise, the
unobserved informations ξAjt may be correlated with the viewership of TV channels ln(yit)
as well.
To address these problems, we use the number of films broadcast during prime time,
the total amount of French audiovisual programs being broadcast during the year, the total
quantity of advertising on the radio market, and a published indicator called the average
watching time per day per individual as instrumental variables. Both films and audiovisual
programs are genres of programs that have important heterogeneities in quality. More-
over, as explained previously, their broadcasting quantities are more the consequence of
regulation than the profit maximizing choices of TV stations. These factors guarantee the
exogeneity of the number of films broadcast during prime time and of the total amount of
French audiovisual programs being broadcast during the year in Equation (16). The vari-
able average watching time per day per individual measures the average number of minutes
per day that an individual spends on watching either a broadcast or a pay TV in France.
It is an indicator of the change in consumption demand for TV; so, it is clearly correlated
with the audience of any TV channel ln(yit).21 However, this variable does not reflect
the particular quality of any broadcast TV channel; therefore, it should be considered as
exogenous in the equation of demand of advertisers.
To validate our choice of instruments, we conduct statistical tests for weak instruments
and overidentification of the IV estimations of Equations (15) and (16). The results are
reported in Table 9 in Appendix 1 for different values of the market size Mt. As we use
the total population having access to a TV service to approximate the total population
watching television, we indeed need to check how the estimations are robust to this approx-
imation. For both equations and for all values of Mt, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic
rejects the null of under-identification at the 1% significance level; the Stock-Yogo weak
instrument test suggests the instruments are strong, while the Hansen J statistic does not
reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid at the 5% and 10% significance
21Notice that this variable is not a simple transformation of the viewership of broadcast TV. It takes
into account the consumption demand for pay TVs as well.
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levels. In other words, our instruments are statistically meaningful.
5.2 Estimates
The estimation results of Equations (15) and (16) are separately reported in Tables 10 - 11
in Appendix 1. Notice that scaling down the value of Mt does not significantly affect the
estimated coefficients. This means that our estimates are robust and that, for the sequel,
we can choose any market size. In practice, we use the total population who watch TV.
For the viewers’ demand, both the coefficient on the advertising αˆ and on the within-
nest shares σˆ are significant at the 5% significance level. As expected, the TV viewers
respond to an increase of advertising by reducing their watching demand, i.e., αˆ < 0. The
estimate σˆ is significantly less than 1, indicating that there exists competition between
the five incumbents and the new channels; however, the value of σˆ suggests that there is
segmentation between categories.
To determine whether the instruments used in the estimation are helpful in fixing the
endogeneity bias, we compare the results from the IV estimation with those from OLS in
Table 12 in Appendix 1. We observe that the parameter estimates associated with the
advertising quantity and the within-nest share in the viewers’ demand function strongly
differ under the two types of estimation. Without controlling for the endogeneity bias, the
quantity of advertising reflects the quality of TV channel and is estimated to have a positive
effect on the audience of the channel. The disutility effect of advertising can be isolated
from the quality of the TV channel only if the endogeneity bias is properly controlled for.
Moreover, with the nested-logit model specification, the value of σˆ should be between 0
and 1. This constraint is not satisfied by the OLS estimation, but it is respected when we
control for the endogeneity problem.
For the advertisers’ demand, the coefficient θˆ associated with the logarithm of the ad-
vertising quantity ln(Ait) is estimated to be significant at 5% significance level, and the
coefficient νˆ4 associated with the logarithm of the audience level ln(yit) is estimated to be
significant at 1% significance level. The estimated results are consistent with our expecta-
tion in theory: The parameter νˆ4 is positive, which suggests that advertisers’ willingness
to pay increases with the viewership of TV channels; the negative sign of θˆ reflects the
combined effect of business stealing and decreasing return to scale of advertising.
As for the demand of TV viewers, we compare the results from the IV estimation with
those from OLS in Table 13 in Appendix 1. We observe that the IV estimates are not
significantly different from the OLS estimates. Our results suggest that the endogeneity
problems in Equation (16) are not statistically significant. In the sequel, we adopt the
IV estimates, while the results below would not change significantly by using the OLS
estimates.
6 Empirical analysis
6.1 Demand elasticities
The estimated elasticities of demand of TV viewers are reported in Tables 14 - 16 in
Appendix 1. On average, the TV viewers dislike advertising: A 1% increase in advertising
reduces the audience of a TV channel by 0.5%. Notice that the TV viewers are more
sensitive to ads of the new digital channels than to the ads of the incumbent channels.
Moreover, the viewers’ adverseness to advertising has increased in time, which may be due
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to the increase in broadcast TV service offers in the market. Finally, we observe that the
own-advertising-elasticities of audience differ according to the nature of the TV channel:
Public channels, private news channels, and other private channels.
The estimates on the viewers’ cross-advertising elasticities of demand indicate that an
increase in the advertising quantity of a TV channel has non-negligible positive effect on
the audience of the other TV channels. On average, 1% increase in the advertising quantity
of a TV channel raises the audience of another TV channel by 0.03%.22 Overall, it seems
more likely to observe a raise in the audience of other channels when an incumbent channel
increases its advertising quantity.
The estimates of the inverse-demand curve of advertisers suggest that a 1% increase
in viewership increases the average per minute price of advertising by 0.6%, while a 1%
increase in the advertising quantity decreases the average per minute price of advertising
by 0.4%.
6.2 Marginal costs and market conduct
To derive the values of marginal costs of different TV channels, we solve the first-order
conditions associated with the profit maximization function of different TV groups both
under Cournot and under Bertrand competition, which correspond to Equation (12) and
Equation (14). We take into account the ownership of TV channels for this purpose. The
21 TV channels in our data set belong separately to 10 different TV groups, among which 9
groups have each one a unique advertising sales house for all their channels. The exceptional
case is the TF1 Group. Channels TMC and NT1 have managed their advertising offers
through an advertising sales house (ASH) independent of the ASH of TF1 Group during
the entire period of observation. We therefore specify TMC and NT1 as belonging to a
different entity than TF1 Group, which maximizes the joint profit of channel TMC and
NT1.
A comparison of estimated marginal costs under the two alternatives is provided in
Table 3. Clearly, the estimates under the Bertrand assumption do not sound economically
meaningful, as they are either negative or much larger than observed prices. In practice,
the quantities of advertising on TVs are at least physically constrained by the time of the
day. In light of the literature on market conduct under capacity constraints, we conjecture
that the channels compete in quantity setting on the advertising market.23
To test this conjecture, we implement a variant of the Davidson and MacKinnon (1981)
J test, which aims to select the specification of an econometric model in the presence of
one or more alternative hypotheses that purport to explain the same phenomenon. In
our context, it can be applied using the estimated marginal costs of TV channels to test
between the null hypothesis H0 of Cournot competition against the alternative hypothesis
H1 of Bertrand competition.
Let cco (cbe) and MKco (MKbe) denote the vectors of estimated marginal costs and
estimated mark-ups under Cournot and Bertrand assumptions, respectively. Let p denote
the vector of observed prices, and Z is a vector of variables affecting the marginal costs of
different TV channels across different periods of time.
22More disaggregated cross-advertising elasticities of audience are available from the authors upon re-
quest.
23On this point, we refer to Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) who study a two-stage oligopoly game where,
under a quantity precommitment, the Cournot outcome is the unique equilibrium solution of the price com-
petition. In a related setting, Osborne and Pitchik (1986) show that, if capacities are chosen simultaneously
before prices, the set of equilibrium capacities coincides with the set of Cournot quantities.
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Table 3: Estimated marginal costs
Year Observed average price Marginal cost under
Cournot
Marginal cost under
Bertrand
2008 4939 1784 31241
2009 4844 1615 9060
2010 4844 146 5829
2011 5315 1541 -4996
2012 5600 1618 -1173
2013 4179 1087 15562
Under the Cournot assumption, we assume
cco = Zµ+ ε1 (18)
and p = MKco + cco, while under the Bertrand assumption, we assume
cbe = Zλ+ ε2 (19)
and p = MKbe + cbe, with ε1 and ε2 following standard normal distributions.
The Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) J test consists first in estimating by OLS regres-
sion a linear model of the following form:
p = (1− α)(MKco + Zµ) + α(MKbe + Zλˆ) + u, (20)
where λˆ is the OLS estimate in Equation (19), and u is white noise. If α = 0, the conduct
is of the Cournot type, while α = 1 corresponds to Bertrand competition. The value of
remains to be tested by an asymptotic t-test.
In Appendix 2, we provide details on the test and prove that estimating Equation (20)
is equivalent to estimate
cco = α(MKbe −MKco) + Zγ + u. (21)
We cannot reject Cournot competition if αˆ ≈ 0 and γˆ ≈ µˆ, where µˆ is the OLS estimate
in Equation (18).
To implement this procedure, we include in the vector Z the following variables: Num-
ber of employees of different TV groups and dummies for controlling for channel and time
fixed effects.24 The results of the test are provided in Table 17 in Appendix 1. From
column 2, we can conclude that we cannot reject H0, i.e., we cannot reject that αˆ = 0 and
γˆ = µˆ. In other words, we cannot reject the Cournot outcome as the best hypothesis to
explain the data generating process.
Equivalently, we could test Bertrand against Cournot by estimating the following equa-
tion:
p = (1− β)(MKbe + Zλ) + β(MKco + Zµˆ) + v. (22)
Our estimate of β is not significantly different from one, which allows us to reject the
Bertrand assumption.
24The number of employees is used here to approximate the size of TV groups.
18
7 Competitive analysis
In this section, we show that it is crucial to account for the two-sidedness nature of the
TV market to properly measure the market power of channels and the impact of mergers.
7.1 Lerner Index versus price-cost margins
Consider the estimated marginal costs under Cournot competition, we can compute the TV
channels’ price-cost margins on the advertising market. More specifically, the estimated
profit margins of TV channels can be ranked in three levels: Approximately 40%−50% for
the public channels, above 80% for the private new channels, and approximately 60%−80%
for the other private channels.25 Due to the unobserved discounts, our estimated price-cost
margins are potentially overestimated. However, we can show that the Lerner Index, which
is the correct measure of market power, always takes lower values than the corresponding
price-cost margin, for any given level of marginal cost.
Following Rochet and Tirole (2006), the Lerner Index of a TV channel can be expressed
as follows:
pj − (cj + pvj )
pj
= − 1
EAj ,pj
, (23)
where EAj ,pj is the price elasticity of advertisers’ demand and pvj , which represents the
advertising cost on the viewers’ side, is defined as
pvj = −pjEyj ,AjEpj ,yj −
1
Aj
∑
i 6=j,i∈Gk
AipiEpi,yiEyi,Aj , (24)
where Eyj ,Aj and Eyi,Aj are the own- and cross- advertising elasticity of viewers’ demand
and Epj ,yj is the advertisers’ willingness to pay for the TV channel’s viewership.
In general, the sign of pvj is indeterminate. The first term on the right-hand side of
Equation (24) (−pjEyj ,AjEpj ,yj ) is positive when viewers dislike advertising and negative
in the opposite case. However, the first term always has an opposite sign to the second
term (− 1Aj
∑
i 6=j,i∈Gk AipiEpi,yiEyi,Aj ). In our case, as viewers dislike advertising, the
second term, which is negative here, is always smaller than the first term in absolute value
because of the small estimated values of the cross-advertising elasticity of TV viewers
(Eyi,Aj ). Hence, the sign of pvj is positive for all the observations. In other words, as
viewers dislike advertising, the disutility increases the effective marginal cost of advertising
to TV channels.
Then, the “opportunity cost”, namely, cj + pvj , of an additional minute of advertising
is positive and higher than the marginal cost cj , as it induces additional nuisance to TV
viewers, and so a potential decrease in advertisers’ willingness to pay. In this case, the
Lerner index defined by Equation (23) is lower than the price-cost margins.
To show how important it is to account for two-sidedness in this market, we compute
the ratio pv/p to provide the share of advertising prices, which are, in some sense, devoted
to compensating viewers for the adverse effect of advertising. Detailed ratios pv/p by
channel are provided in Table 4. In sum, this ratio can be ranked in two levels: 5%− 16%
for the public channels and 21%− 52% for the private channels, which are high enough to
show evidence that the price-cost margins is not a good indicator of the market power of
TV channels.
The analysis above can be applied to any other two-sided markets.
25More disaggregated price-cost margins are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 4: Lerner Indexes in the broadcast TV market
Channel pv/p Channel pv/p Channel pv/p
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
TF1 35.28% 0.04 NT1 41.02% 0.08 D17 27.72% 0.07
M6 36.44% 0.06 W9 32.43% 0.10 D8 34.42% 0.09
F2 15.71% 0.02 I-Télé 49.92% 0.13 RNJ12 39.68% 0.13
F3 10.86% 0.02 BFM 52.27% 0.13 Gulli 20.77% 0.11
F4 11.91% 0.03 RMC 31.17% 0.06 Chérie25 24.34% 0.08
F5 4.97% 0.02 Numéro23 24.90% 0.10 HD1 36.77% 0.09
TMC 41.39% 0.07 6ter 21.47% 0.03 Équipe21 50.98% 0.12
7.2 Evaluation of a merger between advertising sales houses
In 2010, the French competition authority (AdC) approved the acquisition of channels TMC
and NT1 by the TF1 group under several behavioral remedies. One of the main concerns
of the AdC was that the TF1 group could abuse its dominant position on the advertising
market to raise unilaterally either its advertising spot prices or the number of advertising
minutes. According to the AdC, the TF1 group could have forced the advertisers, who
were fighting for the advertising spaces of the TF1 channel, to buy advertising spaces of
the TMC and NT1 channels at the same time, and by so doing, could have manipulated the
advertising market equilibrium (in terms of price and quantity). Therefore, as one of the
established behavioral remedies to approve the merger, the AdC required the independence
of advertising offers, i.e., the independence of ads-sales houses, between the TF1 channel
and the TMC and NT1 channels.
Given the network externalities between TV viewers and advertisers, the merger effect
of ads-sales houses on the quantity of advertising supply is indeterminate in theory. As
discussed previously, a rise in the quantity of advertising could have a negative effect on
the viewership of TV channels, which in turn would reduce advertisers’ willingness to pay.
Broadcasters could either increase or decrease their advertising supply to maximize their
profits.
One cannot conclude that the remedy, i.e., the independence of ads-sales houses, has
been effective simply from the historical change in consumer surplus. Indeed, the consumer
surplus computed from our demand specification has kept increasing after the French com-
petition authority’s decision.26 However, this result could be due to either the remedy or
other effects, such as the extension of the digital market.
It is then required to compare the observed situation with a counterfactual experiment,
where the merger would have been fully approved, including the merger of the ad-sales
houses and maintaining all else as equal. To do so, we insert the estimated demand side
parameters in the supply equation to simulate the equilibrium outcome in a scenario where
the supply decision of the three merging channels is now made by one unique entity. It is
noteworthy to mention that our counterfactual experiment avoids the conventional criticism
against merger simulation which ignores the efficiency gains of merger and acquisition,
because we observe a specific period (01/2010-12/2013), during which the acquisition has
26Based on our demand specification, the surplus of TV viewers can be computed using the formula
CS_viewers = − 1
α
ln[1 +
∑
g[
∑
j∈Cg exp(
δjt
(1− σ) )]
(1−σ)]. (See Williams, 1977 and Small and Rosen, 1981.)
We establish detailed evolution of the viewers’ surplus during 2008-2013 in Figure 4 in Appendix 3.
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occurred but the advertising sales houses of the three channels are maintained independent.
As we simulate the merger of advertising sales houses in this background, we systematically
take into account the efficient gains of the acquisition.
Comparing the observed and simulated situations provides a clear conclusion: The
merger of the two advertising agencies does not affect significantly the market equilibrium
outcomes in terms of advertising quantities and prices. More precisely, merging the ad-
vertising sales houses would have increased the total advertising quantity in the market
only by 3%, and would have decreased the average advertising prices of the market only
by 0.8%. This suggests that, with or without the remedy, the market outcomes are almost
equivalent. In fact, the channels’ potential benefit from a cooperation among advertising
sales houses is defeated by the viewers’ adverse taste for advertising, i.e., by the effect
of the feedback loop between viewers and advertisers. This feedback loop works like a
countervailing power to the impact of cooperation among advertising sales houses.27
These results provide evidence that the remedies imposed by the French competition
authority in this concentration operation were basically unnecessary.
8 Conclusion
This paper provides an empirical evaluation of the significance and the magnitude of
two-sided network externalities in the French broadcast TV market. We identify the shape
of the feedback loop between TV viewers and advertisers and clarify the conduct of TV
channels on the advertising market. Our results suggest that the nature of competition
between TV channels in the advertising market is of Cournot type, and that the network
externalities between TV viewers and advertisers are significant and affect the competition
outcomes at equilibrium: The fraction of profit margins as a result of these externalities
among viewers and advertisers is estimated to be very large.
We also provide a credible evaluation of the traditional economic tools implemented
by competition authorities in this market. We first show how the values of Lerner Index,
which measures the market power, depart from the corresponding price-cost margins in
the TV advertising market. We next examine the effectiveness of a recent decision of the
French competition authority which approves for acquisition of two broadcast TV channels
by the large TV group only under behavioral remedies, including the maintenance of an
independent advertising sales house of the two acquired channels.
Our analysis provide empirical evidence that the price-cost margin is not a good indica-
tor of market power of firms operating in a two-sided market. We also show by counterfac-
tual simulation that merging the advertising sales houses of different TV channels of a big
TV group would not significantly affect the equilibrium outcomes in this market because
of the strong network externalities between TV viewers and advertisers. In other words,
we conclude that the implemented behavioral remedies is unnecessary in this context.
As usual, this paper opens new questions. In particular, our analysis is based on at least
three assumptions: The quality of TV programs is exogenous; the link between advertising
and the choice of TV programs is given; the discounts on the advertising prices are linear.
Relaxing these assumptions calls for further research to develop an extensive analysis of
the functioning of TV markets and advertising competition.
27Detailed comparisons of the market equilibrium levels of advertising quantity and price with and
without merging the ads-sales houses of the three channels are provided in Figure 5 in Appendix 3.
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APPENDIX 1: Tables
Table 5: List of TV channels
Channels Type Nature Media Group membership
TF1 generalist commercial TF1 Group
M6 generalist commercial M6 Group
F2 generalist public FTV Group
F3 generalist public FTV Group
F4 generalist public FTV Group
F5 generalist public FTV Group
TMC generalist commercial TF1 Group∗
NT1 generalist commercial TF1 Group∗
W9 generalist commercial M6 Group
I-Télé news commercial Canal plus Group
BFM news commercial NextRadioTV Group
D17 music commercial Canal plus Group
D8 generalist commercial Canal plus Group
RNJ12 generalist commercial RNJ Group
Gulli child commercial Lagardère Group
RMC Découverte documentary commercial NextRadioTV Group
Numéro 23 generalist commercial La télédiversité Group
6ter generalist commercial M6 Group
Chérie 25 generalist commercial NRJ Group
HD1 film commercial TF1 Group
L’Équipe 21 sport commercial Amaury Group
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Table 6: Means and standard errors of advertising prices and quantities
Average price per spot of advert Numbe of spots per channel per month
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
2008 4938.52 7912.97 5388.85 2345.24
2009 4843.78 7268.86 5850.02 2738.66
2010 4984.39 7103.38 6657.89 2978.17
2011 5315.10 7403.49 7101.16 3155.22
2012 5599.90 7401.01 6899.92 3239.77
2013 4179.09 6473.68 7168.19 3196.28
Note: Units of prices are not reported for confidentiality reasons.
Table 7: Ratio of observed advertising quantities to authorized ceilings
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Incumbent Channels Channel 1 50.9% 43.5% 53.6% 53.8% 43.3% 44.4%
Channel 2 41.0% 29.9% 38.1% 38.6% 35.6% 39.1%
Channel 3 20.0% 22.1% 28.2% 29.7% 27.6% 27.7%
Channel 4 83.7% 56.9% 64.7% 58.3% 56.4% 70.1%
Channel 5 92.6% 67.7% 73.6% 69.7% 71.6% 75.3%
Channels Channel 6 43.2% 50.5% 66.6% 68.1% 61.9% 81.1%
launched in 2012 Channel 7 34.3% 35.3% 33.2% 30.5% 33.2% 43.4%
Channel 8 33.0% 34.0% 37.8% 49.2% 62.5% 54.9%
Channel 9 19.8% 29.8% 38.0% 35.3% 29.2% 37.6%
Channel 10 18.3% 19.6% 20.2% 24.5% 31.6% 38.4%
Channel 11 29.1% 31.4% 37.4% 58.0% 71.4% 72.1%
Channel 12 36.6% 45.2% 48.7% 52.0% 70.0% 77.5%
Channel 13 41.9% 44.3% 52.0% 50.1% 69.0% 77.9%
Channel 14 23.5% 33.6% 39.6% 43.5% 59.0% 74.7%
Channel 15 45.2% 51.0% 51.9% 58.0% 64.8% 85.0%
Channels Channel 16 29.3%
launched in 2012 Channel 17 27.2%
Channel 18 45.3%
Channel 19 26.6%
Channel 20 33.6%
Channel 21 54.9%
Note: The names of TV channels are not reported for confidentiality reasons.
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Table 8: List of additional variables
Variable name Unit Periodicity Mean
Average watching time Minutes per
day per in-
dividual
monthly 217.65
Total amount of advertising invest-
ment in the cinema market
Millions of
Euros
monthly 26798.182
Total quantity of advertising in the ra-
dio market
Number of
spots
monthly 128071.7
Total amount of French audiovisual
programs
Number of
hours per
channel
annually 48.010
Number of movies broadcast from
20h30-22h30
Per channel annually 75.869
Financial participation on movie pro-
duction
Per channel annually 8.353
Financial participation on regulated
audiovisual production
Per channel annually 44.493
French population size Millions annually 62.97
Subsidy Millions of
Euros
annually 698.501
Employees Per media
group
annually 9712.947
Table 9: Tests for the validity of instruments
Market size 0.25 Mt 0.5 Mt 0.75 Mt Mt
Test for the viewers’ demand
equation
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (p-
value)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic (p-
value)
11.059 11.059 11.059 11.615
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.195 0.169 0.127 0.058
Test for the viewers’ demand
equation
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (p-
value)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic (p-
value)
8.638 8.638 8.638 8.638
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.107
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Table 10: Estimation of TV viewers’ demand (No. of observations: 689 )
Market size 0.25 Mt 0.5 Mt 0.75 Mt Mt
Quantity of advertising (α) -0.667** -0.653** -0.626** -0.551**
(0.274) (0.272) (0.270) (0.251)
Within-nest share (σ) 0.359* 0.355* 0.347* 0.367**
(0.186) (0.186) (0.184) (0.184)
Channel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Statistic 41.04 42.76 46.12 59.44
R-Squared 0.421 0.433 0.456 0.545
Note: (i) Mt denotes the total French population having access to TV service; (ii) Estimations
are performed by applying the two-step feasible GMM; (iii) Standard errors are in parentheses:
***p<0.01, **p<0.05,***p<0.1.
Table 11: Estimation of advertisers’ demand (No. of observations: 689 )
Market sizes 0.25 Mt 0.5 Mt 0.75 Mt Mt
Log(Quantity of advertising) (θ) -0.373** -0.373** -0.373** -0.373**
(0.153) (0.153) (0.153) (0.153)
Log(No. of viewers) (v4) 0.606*** 0.606*** 0.606*** 0.606***
(0.149) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149)
Channel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Statistic 19.66 19.66 19.66 19.66
R-Squared 0.430 0.430 0.430 0.430
Note: (i) Mt denotes the total French population having access to TV service; (ii) Estimations
are performed by applying the two-step feasible GMM; (iii) Standard errors are in parentheses:
***p<0.01, **p<0.05,***p<0.1.
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Table 12: Estimation of the TV viewers’ demand (No. of observations: 689 )
OLS IV
Quantity of advertising (α) 0.342*** -0.551**
(0.116) (0.251)
Within-nest share (σ) 1.030*** 0.367**
(0.142) (0.184)
Channel FE Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.795 0.545
Note: The dependent variable is log market share of a TV channel minus log market share of the
outside goods (See Equation 16). In the table, we compare OLS estimates to the IV estimates.
The robustness correction is applied to both estimations so that the standard errors are robust to
the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity. The standard errors of estimates are in parentheses.
The significant levels are such that ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and ***p<0.1. The channel fixed effect,
yearly dummies and monthly dummies are included in the regressions. Their estimates are not
reported but are available upon request. All of these coefficients are statistically significant.
Table 13: Estimation of advertisers’ demand (No. of observations: 689 )
OLS IV
Log(Quantity of advertising) (θ) -0.261* -0.373**
(0.126) (0.153)
Log(No. of viewers) (v4) 0.723*** 0.606**
(0.149) (0.149)
Channel FE Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.433 0.430
Note: The dependent variable is log spot price of advertising (see Equation 17). In the table,
we compare OLS estimates to the TV estimates. The robustness correction is applied to both
estimations so that the standard errors are robust to the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
The standard errors of estimates are in parentheses. The significant levels are such that ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, and ***p<0.1. The channel fixed effect, yearly dummies and monthly dummies are
included in the regressions. Their estimates are not reported but are available upon request. The
monthly dummies are very significant but the yearly dummies are not.
Table 14: Own-advertising-elasticity of audience of incumbents versus new arrivals
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Incumbent -0.373 -0.365 -0.425 -0.409 -0.390 -0.430
(0.234) (0.229) (0.266) (0.256) (0.240) (0.269)
New -0.465 -0.527 -0.593 -0.657 -0.641 -0.642
(0.292) (0.311) (0.373) (0.413) (0.404) (0.408)
Note: The standard errors computed by delta method are in parentheses.
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Table 15: Own-advertising-elasticity of audience
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Public channels -0.227 -0.216 -0.272 -0.272 -0.235 -0.258
(0.143) (0.136) (0.172) (0.171) (0.112) (0.163)
Private news -0.668 -0.761 -0.887 -0.937 -0.846 -0.923
channels (0.425) (0.483) (0.563) (0.594) (0.536) (0.585)
Other private -0.477 -0.523 -0.578 -0.625 -0.634 -0.638
channels (0.299) (0.327) (0.361) (0.391) (0.397) (0.402)
Note: The standard errors computed by delta method are in parentheses.
Table 16: Cross-advertising-elasticity of audience
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Incumbent 0.053 0.051 0.057 0.053 0.050 0.078
(0.032) (0.031) (0.035) (0.033) (0.031) (0.049)
New 0.011 0.013 0.017 0.020 0.020 0.017
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013)
Note: The standard errors computed by delta method are in parentheses.
Table 17: Test Cournot versus Bertrand (No. of observations: 689 )
Step one
Estimation of
Equation (18)
Step two
Estimation of Equa-
tion (21)
Difference of mark-ups 0.0002*
(0.0001)
No. of employees -0.002* -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Fixed effects
Channel Yes Yes
Month Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.122 0.133
Note: The estimates of-fixed effects included in the regressions are not reported but are available
upon request. The standard errors of estimates are in parentheses. The significant levels are such
that ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, and ***p<0.1.
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APPENDIX 2: Test Cournot versus Bertrand
We develop the expression of Equation (20) as follows:
p = MKco − αMKco + (1− α)Zµ+ α(MKbe + Zλˆ) + u.
Rearranging, one obtains
p−MKco = α(MKbe −MKco) + Z(µ− αµ+ αλˆ) + u
and
cco = α(MKbe −MKco) + Zγ + u,
where γ = µ− αµ+ αλˆ. If αˆ = 0, we have γˆ = µˆ.
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APPENDIX 3: Figures
Figure 1: Seasonality of TV Ad Quantity
Each line represents one channel, we do not mention their names for confidentiality reason.
Figure 2: Cinema Ad Expenditure Figure 3: Radio Ad Quantity
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Figure 4: Evolution of the viewers’ surplus during 2008-2013.
(Note that we cannot convert units into euros without observing the viewers’ paying to re-
move advertising. The numbers on the “Y-axis” have no direct interpretation. However, for the
purpose of our analysis, what matters is the trend of evolution of the line.)
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Figure 5: Comparison of advertising quantities and prices with and without merging the
ads-sales houses of TF1, TMC and NT1
(Note: SA_m and SA_nm represent the total advertising quantity in the market with and without
the merger. Ap_m and Ap_nm represent the average advertising prices in the market with and
without the merger. The advertising quantities are measured in thousands of spots. The units of
prices are scaled down for confidentiality reason.)
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